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Abstract
Global monetary conditions have often been cited as a driving factor of commodity prices.
This paper investigates the empirical relationship between US monetary policy and commodity
prices by means of a standard VAR system, commonly used in analysing the e⁄ects of monetary
policy shocks. The results suggest that expansionary US monetary policy shocks drove up the
broad commodity price index and all of its components. While these e⁄ects are signi￿cant,
they however do not appear to be overwhelmingly large. This ￿nding is also con￿rmed under
di⁄erent identi￿cation strategies for the monetary policy shock.
JEL Classi￿cation: E31, E40, C32.
Keywords: Monetary policy Shock, Oil Price, VAR.5
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Non-technical summary
Commodity price developments have been one of the major sources of concern for policymakers
during the recent years. A wide strand of literature has examined the impact of commodity prices
on macroeconomic variables and the stance of monetary policy. Fewer attention has however been
devoted to the other direction of causality, i.e. the impact of monetary conditions on oil and other
commodity prices.
During the commodity price surge of 2008 some commentators indicated that loose monetary
policy and persistently low interest rates could have at least in part fuelled the price hike (Hamilton,
2009). If this is so, it is then relevant to understand whether and to what extent the massive
monetary policy easing which is nowadays taking place may sow the seeds for another surge in
commodity prices. The aim of this paper is indeed to analyze to what extent an expansionary
monetary policy shock may drive up commodity prices and through which channel.
Since the seminal contribution by Frankel (1984), monetary conditions and interest rates
have attracted attention as possible driving factors of commodity prices. Most of the empirical
literature devoted to the assessment of the relationship between monetary policy and commodity
prices has focused on the US interest rate as an indicator of monetary policy stance (Frankel and
Rose, 2009). However, interest rates may not fully represent the impact of a monetary policy shock
and, more importantly, their movements can re￿ ect the endogenous response of monetary policy
to the general developments of the economy.
Our strategy is to identify a monetary policy shock in a VAR system for the US economy,
and then assess its impact on commodity prices. This allows us not only to examine the impact of
monetary policy net of other interaction channels, but also to avoid employing indicators of global
monetary conditions which are inherently di¢ cult to measure. Our main ￿nding is that there is
empirical evidence of a signi￿cant impact of monetary policy on commodity prices; in particular,
an expansionary monetary policy shock drives up the broad commodity price index and all of its
major components. This result is robust to the use of several di⁄erent identi￿cation strategies of
the monetary policy shock.
The variance decomposition suggests however that the impact of monetary policy on com-
modity prices is rather limited, though statistically signi￿cant. Still, we try to shed some light
on the channel through which monetary policy shocks a⁄ect commodity prices, focusing on the
case of oil. In particular, we investigate whether the positive impact on oil prices of a monetary
policy loosening can be ascribed to incentives to stock accumulation, disincentives to immediate
production or to ￿nancial ￿ ows. Results show that all these direct channels display the expected
sign, but the bulk of the impact of monetary policy on commodity prices seems to transit through
the indirect channel of expected growth and in￿ ation, as also reported by Barsky and Kilian (2004).
Our ￿ndings also suggest that the extraordinarily monetary policy easing deployed to contrast6
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the real e⁄ects of the ￿nancial crisis is likely to push commodity prices up, albeit to a small
extent. However, we acknowledge that our identi￿cation scheme is not designed to account for
unconventional monetary policy measures, so that larger e⁄ects cannot be ruled out.7
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1 Introduction
Commodity price developments have been one of the major sources of concern for policymakers
during the recent years. After having surged with increasing momentum to unprecedented levels
in the course of 2008, prices of commodities fell abruptly in the wake of the ￿nancial crisis and the
global economic downturn. Since the beginning of 2009, however, commodity prices ￿rst stabilised,
and then resumed an upward path, characterized by relatively high volatility. As commodity prices
in general ￿and the oil price in particular ￿are an important component of Consumer Price Indexes,
the evolution of these prices and the driving forces behind them are clearly crucial for the conduct
of monetary policy (Svensson, 2005).
A wide strand of literature has examined the impact of commodity prices ￿oil in particular
￿on macroeconomic variables (see e.g. Kilian, 2008, for a survey), but fewer attention has been
devoted to the other direction of causality, i.e. the impact of monetary conditions on oil and other
commodity prices. In this paper we focus on the latter, to analyze to what extent an expansionary
monetary policy shock may drive up commodity prices and through which channel.
While supply and demand factors can in general explain the bulk of the ￿ uctuations in
commodity prices, other forces may at times play a role (Hamilton, 2009). Kilian (2009) and
Alquist and Kilian (2010) highlight the relevance of precautionary demand shocks, which increase
current demand for oil due to an increase in uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls, in the
behaviour of oil prices.1 Since the seminal contribution by Frankel (1984), monetary conditions
and interest rates have attracted attention as possible driving factors of commodity prices. Frankel
(1986) extends Dornbusch￿ s theory of exchange rate overshooting to the case of commodities and,
using no-arbitrage conditions, derives a theoretical link between oil prices and interest rates. Barsky
and Kilian (2002, 2004) show that monetary policy stance is a good predictor of commodity prices.
In particular, Barsky and Kilian (2002) also suggest that the oil price increases of the 1970s could
have been caused, at least in part, by monetary conditions.2
Most of the empirical literature devoted to the assessment of the relationship between mone-
tary policy and commodity prices has focused on the US interest rate as an indicator of monetary
policy stance (Frankel, 2007, Frankel and Rose, 2009). However, interest rates may not fully repre-
sent the impact of a monetary policy shock and, more importantly, their movements can re￿ ect the
endogenous response of monetary policy to the general developments of the economy. For instance,
Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997), using a VAR framework, suggest that positive shocks to the
oil price induce a monetary policy response which can amplify the contractionary e⁄ects of the oil
1Anzuini, Pagano and Pisani (2007) show that such oil shocks contributed signi￿cantly to the US recessions in
the last thirty years.
2Nakov and Pescatori (2010) argue, in line with Kilian (2009), that oil prices should be treated endogenously also
in DSGE models. In such a framework, Gillman and Nakov (2008) ￿nd that nominal oil prices reacts proportionally
to nominal interest rates shocks8
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price shock itself; Kilian and Lewis (2009), however, report no evidence of systematic Fed reaction
to oil shocks after 1987.
During the commodity price surge of 2008 some commentators indicated that loose monetary
policy and persistently low interest rates could have at least in part fuelled the price hike (Hamilton,
2009). If this is so, it is then relevant to understand whether and to what extent the massive
monetary policy easing which is nowadays taking place may sow the seeds for another surge in
commodity prices. In this paper, we will not work with a plain analysis of comovements between
commodity prices and interest rates, but rather identify a monetary policy shock in a VAR system
for the US economy, and then assess its impact on commodity prices. This allows us not only
to examine the impact of monetary policy net of other interaction channels, but also to avoid
employing indicators of global monetary conditions which are inherently di¢ cult to measure. More
speci￿cally, we will use a standard identi￿cation scheme for the monetary policy shock (Kim, 1999)
and we will then project each of the commodity prices on this shock in order to single out the
responses of the di⁄erent prices to the same monetary policy shock. We ￿nd empirical evidence
of a signi￿cant impact of monetary policy on commodity prices; in particular, an expansionary
monetary policy shock drives up the broad commodity price index and all of its major components.
Although the methodology is very di⁄erent, our approach is similar in spirit to that of Frankel and
Hardouvelis (1985), which investigated the impact of money supply announcements on commodity
prices; the main methodological di⁄erence lies in the fact that in our case we work with an identi￿ed
monetary policy shock in a VAR system.
In addition, we assess the robustness of the results by repeating the exercise using several
di⁄erent identi￿cation strategies of the monetary policy shock, which are commonly used in the
literature. In particular, remaining in a VAR context, we used also the Choleski identi￿cation
strategy proposed by Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and that based on sign restrictions in the spirit of
Uhlig (2005) and Canova and De Nicol￿ (2002). The actual implementation of the sign restrictions
is obtained through the algorithm developed in Rubio-Ram￿rez et al. (2010). We also analysed the
e⁄ect on commodity prices of the monetary policy shocks identi￿ed according to Kuttner (2001)
and Romer and Romer (2004). Overall, all these di⁄erent strategies lead to similar conclusions.
The variance decomposition suggests that the impact of monetary policy on commodity prices
is rather limited, though statistically signi￿cant. Still, we try to shed some light on the channel
through which monetary policy shocks a⁄ect commodity prices, focusing on the case of oil. In
particular, we investigate whether the positive impact on oil prices of a monetary policy loosening
can be ascribed to incentives to stock accumulation, disincentives to immediate production or to
￿nancial ￿ ows. Results show that all these direct channels display the expected sign, but the bulk
of the impact of monetary policy on commodity prices seems to transit through the indirect channel
of expected growth and in￿ ation, as also reported by Barsky and Kilian (2004).
The plan of the paper is the following. In section 2 we evaluate the impact of monetary policy
shocks on the commodity price index and on its major components. In particular, we ￿rst describe9
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1232
August 2010
the theoretical arguments according to which commodity prices should react to monetary policy
shocks. Next, we present the data and the econometric framework, which includes the identi￿cation
scheme, and then we provide VAR evidence and robustness analysis. In section 3 we evaluate the
trasmission channels through which monetary policy may a⁄ect commodity prices. The last section
contains some concluding remarks.
2 Monetary shocks and commodity prices
The impact of monetary policy on commodity prices has been studied by Barsky and Kilian (2002,
2004), who argue that the channel through which monetary policy exerts its impact on commodity
prices is via (expectations of) stronger in￿ ation and economic growth. There are however a number
of other channels, related to the opportunity cost of investing in real assets, according to which
an expansionary monetary policy can cause an increase in commodity prices. Frankel (2007) sum-
marizes them as: i) low interest rates tend to reduce the opportunity cost of carrying inventories,
increasing their demand for commodities; ii) on the supply side, lower rates create an incentive
not to extract today exhaustible commodities, as the cost of holding inventories ￿ in the ground￿
also decreases; iii) for a given expected price path, a decrease in interest rates reduces the carrying
cost of speculative positions, making it easier to bet on assets such as commodities; under certain
conditions, this will put upward pressure on futures price and, by arbitrage, also on spot prices.
To gauge the quantitative e⁄ect of monetary policy shocks on commodity prices, we estimate
a VAR for the US, the largest oil-consuming economy in the world.
2.1 Data and model details
Our dataset consists of monthly variables from January 1970 to September 2009.3 The variables are:
the federal funds rate, the money stock (M2), the consumer price index, the industrial production
index and a commodity price index (in dollars). After identifying the monetary policy shock we
add, ordered as last, the commodity price sub-category for which we are interested in recovering the
response.4 We have considered several commodities, one at a time, but for reasons of space we only
report results for four commodity prices: a broad index, two sub-indices (metals and foodstu⁄s)
and crude oil.
We estimate a VAR system with p = 12 lags including the Federal fund rate, industrial
3Admittedly, this covers a very long time span during which policy shifts may have happened, as also documented
by Barsky and Kilian (2004). For robustness check, we also estimated the model on a restricted, post-Volcker sample
starting in January 1980. Results, available upon request, display however no signi￿cant di⁄erences.
4In practice, we assume that all variables have a contemporaneous e⁄ect on the price of the commodity for which
we want to recover the response, but this last variable does not a⁄ect contemporaneously all the others.10
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production, M2, consumer price index and the commodity price index. All variables except the
Fed fund rate are in log-level and are stored in the vector yt.
The structural form is therefore:
C (L)yt = ￿t;
where C (L) is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator and V CV (￿t) = ￿ is a diagonal matrix
with the variances of the structural shocks as elements. We estimate (ignoring predetermined
variables) the reduced form:
yt = A(L)yt￿1 + "t
where A(L) is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator and V CV ("t) = ￿ and ￿t = C0"t and
therefore ￿ = C￿1
0 ￿C￿10
0 :
In order to obtain a just identi￿ed system we need
n(n￿1)
2 restrictions. Our baseline identi￿-
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where the ￿s denote the structural disturbances while the "s are the residuals in the reduced
form equations, which represent by construction unexpected movements (given the information in
the system) of each variable. All restrictions are zero (exclusion) restrictions.
The ￿rst line of the VAR system, where the interest rate appears on the left hand side, is a
money supply equation modelled as a reaction function of the monetary authority; irrespective of the
identi￿cation scheme used this interpretation is standard in this literature. Here the assumptions
are that, due to an informational delay, the current level of prices and industrial production are
not available to the monetary authorities.
The second line is a standard money demand equation. The demand for real money balances
depends on real activity and the opportunity cost of holding money ￿the nominal interest rate.
The third and fourth lines encapsulate the hypothesis of price stickiness or adjustment costs: real
activity responds to price and ￿nancial signals only with a lag. The interest rate, money, and
the commodity price index are assumed not to a⁄ect real activity contemporaneously. The last
equation is an arbitrage equation which describes equilibrium in the commodity market as a kind
of ￿nancial market equilibrium. All variables are assumed to have contemporaneous e⁄ects on the
commodity price.11
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1232
August 2010
Based on Akaike information criteria we select 12 lags5; with monthly data our lags structure
capture one year of dynamics, which appears to be su¢ cient to eliminate residuals autocorrelation.
After identifying the shock we re-estimate the system adding the oil price or the single





































1 g12 0 0 g15 0
g21 1 g23 g24 0 0
0 0 1 g34 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
g51 g52 g53 g54 1 0




































In ordering the new price as last we allow for a contemporaneous e⁄ect of all other variables
on this price while assuming that any shock to the last variable will a⁄ect all other variables with
a one month delay.6 Kilian and Vega (2008), however, report no evidence of any contemporary
and systematic reaction of oil prices to macroeconomic announcements; based on this result, we
conducted some robustness analysis testing some over-identifying restrictions, in particular: we
estimated a system where g62 = g63 = g64 = 0, and results were virtually unchanged. We then
excluded commodity price from the Fed reaction function (g15 = 0) and again results did not
change.7
2.2 The impact of a conventional monetary policy shock
As said, the US monetary policy shock is identi￿ed in a ￿ve variables VAR system. We here focus
on the response of the commodity price index, which is the variable ordered as last, to the monetary
policy shock, de￿ned as a 100 basis point reduction in the Federal funds rate equation (Figure 1).
All responses have the expected sign. Only the response of the CPI is not signi￿cant, although
the sign is as expected. Focusing on the response of the commodity price index to the monetary
shock, it peaks rather quickly at 5.6% after just three months, then the e⁄ect slowly declines. The
response appears to be signi￿cant and persistent, as it takes three years for it to converge back to
the baseline. The magnitude of the e⁄ect, however, is somehow limited given that the monetary
policy shock leads to an increase of the commodity price index of roughly 3%, in the ￿rst two years
5We however checked that results remained unchanged using 10 up to 14 lags.
6Pagano and Pisani (2009) document that taking into account business cycle indicators may help in forecasting
oil prices.
7Note that in our identi￿cation scheme the Federal Reserve never responds to the development in price of a single
commodity. Moreover, it is worth to remembering that in general a non-zero coe¢ cient in the impact matrix means
that variables may respond contemporaneously to shocks, not that they necessarily do.12
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Notes: the x-axes reports the months after the shock. Dashed lines are 68% con￿dence bands.
after the shock.8 As the e⁄ect on commodity prices is positive and signi￿cant on impact and the
CPI responds only sluggishly, there is a signi￿cant e⁄ect of monetary policy on relative prices. This
e⁄ect is however reabsorbed in the medium run, when CPI starts to increase and commodity prices
converge back to lower levels. The hump-shaped response of commodity prices testi￿es an initial
overshooting ￿which dies out after few quarters ￿with respect to their long run level. This e⁄ect
is usually (see e.g. Furlong and Ingenito, 1996) ascribed to the higher ￿ exibility of the commodity
prices with respect to the price of other items. This interpretation may suggest that part of the
increase in commodity prices is due to the increase in the short term in￿ ation expectation following
a monetary expansion.
8Note that our monetary policy shock has been normalised to 100 basis points, which is quite larger than the
usual one standard deviation shock used in the literature.13
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2.3 The impact on individual commodity prices
After having identi￿ed the monetary policy shock, we add to the system the commodity price for
which we want to trace the response.9 For all the commodities considered a monetary expansion
generates an increase in price, yet the size and the time path of such increase vary considerably
(Figure 2).
The impact on oil is rather sharp, peaking six months after the shock, but then vanishes
after ten months. The response of metals is rather similar, although it has a second (signi￿cant)
peak eighteen months after the shock. Food commodities instead respond in a rather smooth and
persistent fashion, as the e⁄ects remain signi￿cant up to three years after the shock has occurred.
2.4 Robustness
Results presented above rest upon the identifying assumptions of the monetary policy shock. Ad-
mittedly, the scheme we have employed (Kim, 1999) is not the only possible, and we chose it on
the grounds of its close connection with our setup, as well as of its simplicity and widespread use
in the literature. In this section we examine to what extent our results remain valid when using
di⁄erent identi￿cation schemes for the monetary policy shock. The literature on monetary policy
shocks is vast and we do not aim at being exhaustive. Rather, we will concentrate on four schemes
that are somehow stemming from di⁄erent approaches to the issue, and that are very popular in
the applied literature.
The ￿rst alternative shock we will consider is due to Boivin and Giannoni (2006), and is based
on a simple VAR with Choleski identi￿cation featuring (in order) output, in￿ ation, commodity
prices and the Federal funds rate.10 This approach has become very popular in the recent years,
due to its simplicity.
The second alternative identi￿cation scheme is based on sign restrictions. Following, Faust
(1998), Canova and De Nicol￿ (2002), and Uhlig (2005) we impose sign restrictions directly on
impulse responses, i.e., after an expansionary monetary policy shock, the interest rate falls while
money, output, and prices rise. As we focus on the response of the commodity prices no restriction
is imposed on this variable. The response of the single subcomponent of the commodity price index
is then obtained (as before) by simply adding the new variable to the old system without any further
restriction. The actual implementation of this scheme is obtained through a QR decomposition
following Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010). We will use this identi￿cation strategy only to assess the
robustness of the response of commodity prices (and subcomponents) to a monetary policy shock.
9This procedure is often referred to as ￿marginal method￿and has been proposed by Kim (2001).
10Boivin and Giannoni (2006) employ (quarterly) GDP as a measure of output; given our monthly setup, we had
to replace this with Industrial Production. This however seems not to a⁄ect the validity of the identi￿cation scheme.14
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Notes: Dashed lines are 68% con￿dence bands.15
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In fact, sign restrictions have been the subject of some criticism, given that all percentiles of the
distribution in this case are computed across di⁄erent rotations, which correspond to di⁄erent
models (Fry and Pagan, 2007). As a consequence, we see little value in extracting a monetary
policy shock by selecting an arbitrary rotation, or averaging across shocks generated by di⁄erent
rotations, and we will not use it in the robustness analysis of the transmission channel of the next
section.
We then move to other identi￿cation schemes not based on a VAR: our third alternative
relies instead on ￿nancial markets information. Kuttner (2001) proposes to gauge a monetary
policy shocks by subtracting from the actual change in the federal funds rate its expectation, i.e.
compute the di⁄erence between Federal funds futures immediately before and after the decision
of the FOMC. The idea is that many of the monetary policy decisions (and often the size of the
change) are expected and therefore cannot be labelled as ￿shocks￿ . The remaining monetary policy
￿ surprises￿that agents face should hence produce stronger e⁄ects. Such series of monetary policy
shocks is available since 1989, when the futures market for the Fed funds rate was established at
the Chicago Board of Trade. To determine how commodity prices respond to monetary shocks we
simply regress the log change in the commodity price index on a constant, its own lagged values, and
lagged values of the policy measure. The lagged values of the shock series are included to capture
the direct impact of shocks on commodity price change, and the lagged values of commodity price
changes are included to control for the normal dynamics of the commodity price index.11
The last alternative monetary policy shock series we will consider is that derived by Romer
and Romer (2004). Such scheme combines narrative accounts of each FOMC meeting included in
the minutes with the Federal Reserve￿ s internal forecasts of in￿ ation and real activity (the ￿Green-
book￿forecasts) to purge the intended funds rate of monetary policy actions taken in response to
information about future economic developments. The resulting series of monetary shocks should
show changes in the funds rate not taken in response to information about future economic devel-
opments. Unfortunately the series is not very up-to-date as it is available only from January 1969
to December 1996.12
In Figure 3, we plot ￿besides the impulse response function derived with our baseline iden-
ti￿cation scheme (Kim, 1999) and its 68% con￿dence bands ￿ the impulse responses obtained
under the alternative identi￿cation strategies. All the di⁄erent methodologies display an increase
in commodity prices in the ￿rst few months after the shock has occurred.13 The response obtained
11We included 18 lags of (log) commodity price changes and 4 lags of the monetary policy measure, plus a complete
set of monthly dummies.
12In the regression with such shock we include 18 lags of log commodity price change and 6 lags of the monetary
policy measure, plus a complete set of monthly dummies.
13It is worth noticing that this result appears also in other VAR studies on the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks. For
instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), in a recursive VAR featuring (in order) industrial production,
CPI, an index of commodity prices, the Fed funds rate, nonborrowed reserves and total reserves, ￿nd that a standard
deviation increase in the Fed funds delivers a signi￿cant and persistent fall in the commodity price index. Faust,16
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with the monetary shock ￿ la Kuttner (2001) is the most similar on impact, but it is also rather
shortlived. The other responses are less pronounced, but considerably more persistent. Overall,
they support the above conclusion that commodity prices increase after an expansionary monetary
policy shock, but that the size of such e⁄ect is limited.14

























Similar results are obtained for the responses of the individual commodities analyzed before
(see Figure 4). In particular, error bands (not reported) always overlap those obtained with the
identi￿cation by Kim (1999). As for the commodity price index, the responses obtained with the
approach ￿ la Boivin and Giannoni (2006) are very similar to those obtained with the baseline
identi￿cation. Also the response obtained using the monetary shocks calculated by Romer and
Romer (2004) are remarkably close to the baseline median response, especially in the case of oil
and metals.
2.5 Monetary policy and commodity prices ￿ uctuations
Given the signi￿cant e⁄ect of monetary shocks, one may wonder how large is their relative con-
tribution to overall commodity price ￿ uctuations. This question may be tackled by means of a
Swanson and Wright (2004) ￿nd a similar result in a VAR featuring the same variables, but having identi￿ed the
monetary shock with high-frequency ￿nancial merkets data.
14The con￿dence bands for the response of all variables included in the two VARs discussed here are reported in
appendix, alongside the con￿dence bands for the response of all variables derived under the baseline method.17
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forecast error variance decomposition, which measures the percentage share of the forecast error
variance due to a speci￿c shock at a speci￿c time horizon.
In Figure 5 we report the forecast error variance decomposition of the commodity price index
and individual commodities with respect to the monetary shocks. The horizons at which forecast
errors are calculated are indicated on the x-axis. The median percentage of the variance of the
commodity index hovers around 15 percent, whereas contributions to oil and metals prices are,
respectively, around 4 and 8 percent. Food commodities seem to have responded more to monetary
policy shocks, which post a variance contribution of around 20 percent.
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months after the shock
Notes: Dashed lines are 68% con￿dence bands.
Overall, we may conclude that monetary policy shocks help predicting commodity price
movements but these shocks are not the main sources of ￿ uctuations in prices. This result is in
line with that of Barsky and Kilian (2002), Frankel (2007) and Frankel and Rose (2009), who ￿nd,
at best, mixed evidence on the impact of interest rates on commodity prices.
3 The transmission channel
Having found a signi￿cant impact of the monetary policy shocks on commodity prices, however,
does not tell us anything about the channel through which the e⁄ect is taking place. As antici-
pated, besides the indirect impact through expectations of in￿ ation and growth, there are other19
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direct channels through which monetary policy can exert its impact on commodity prices. More
speci￿cally, we have mentioned an ￿ inventory channel￿ , a ￿ supply channel￿and a ￿ ￿nancial channel￿
(Frankel, 2007).
We will here try to assess the relevance of such alternative channels for the case of oil. The
reason of the choice is twofold: on one hand, oil is by far the most relevant commodity for the
global economy, and its macroeconomic impacts have been studied extensively, on the other hand,
comprehensive data is available on inventories and production, which is not the case for other
commodities.
To make such assessment, we will ￿rst check whether the monetary policy shock ￿ la Kim
(1999) is able to explain ￿ uctuations in oil inventories and oil supply, and speculative activity
in futures markets. The data on oil inventories refers to US industry stocks of crude oil,
collected by the US Energy Information Administration, and covers the time span from
January 1970 until September 2009. The data on oil supply refers to world production of crude
oil, as measured by the International Energy agency, and is from February 1984 to September
2009. Measuring speculative activity in crude oil futures market is a more daunting task. The US
Commission for Futures Trading in Commodities (CFTC) collects and disseminates weekly data
on the positions held by non-commercial agents in WTI crude oil futures contracts traded on the
NYMEX; data is available since January 1996. A measure of speculative activity widely employed
in the literature is the so-called non-commercial net long positions, i.e. the di⁄erence between the
number of long and short positions held by agents not related to physical oil.15 The rationale is
that a positive net positioning should suggest that non-commercial agents, i.e. speculators, are
mostly bullish about oil price prospects.
In practical terms, we will regress net long positions in futures and changes in oil supply and
oil stocks on their lags and on the monetary policy shock.16 Results, reported in Table 1, highlight
that all variables are somehow sensible to the monetary policy shock. Furthermore, the signs of the
coe¢ cients are in accordance with the theory: a positive shock (i.e. a tightening of the monetary
policy stance) produces an increase in oil production (as producers ￿nd more convenient to extract
oil today and invest their revenues at higher rates), a decrease in oil inventories (as the opportunity
cost of holding inventories becomes higher), and a decrease in speculative positions (as investors
face a higher opportunity cost). It is also interesting to point that lagged values of the monetary
15There are a number of caveats related to measuring speculative activity with such an indicator. First of all, the
distinction between commercial and non-commercial agents is somehow arbitrary, and does not imply that only non-
commercials can act as speculators: for example, shouldn￿ t an airline betting on oil price increases also be labelled
as speculator? And why should a pension fund taking a long position in energy futures to diversify its portfolio and
hedge against in￿ ation be labelled as speculator? Second, index funds, i.e. ￿nancial instruments that replicate oil
price developments, are managed by swap dealers and are hence fall in the commercial category. Finally, data is
incomplete as it covers only regulated markets.
16The series of oil stocks and, to a lesser extent, oil production present a marked pattern of seasonality, which was
removed by simply regressing on seasonal dummies.20
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Table 1: Regression results of oil supply, oil stocks on the monetary policy shock
Dep. Variable: Supply R2 = 0:0129
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. error t-stat P-value
MP Shock 0.4021 0.2128 1.8897 0.0597
Supply (-1) 0.0432 0.0570 0.7588 0.4485
Dep. Variable: Stocks R2 = 0:0081
Variable Coe¢ cient Std.error t-stat P-value
MPShock -0.5252 0.2755 -1.9063 0.0572
Stocks(-1) 0.0313 0.0460 0.6812 0.4961
Dep. Variable: Net long R2 = 0:5701
Variable Coe¢ cient Std.error t-stat P-value
MPShock -1049589 572459.9 -1.8335 0.068769
Netlong(-1) 0.888 0.081 10.9428 0
Netlong(-2) -0.247 0.107 -2.3145 0.022034
Netlong(-3) 0.188 0.081 2.3193 0.021767
policy shock appear to be non-signi￿cant.17 At any rate, we remark that coe¢ cients are small,
and the R2 of the regression is also extremely tiny.18 Hence, the tentative conclusion could be
that direct transmission channels are signi￿cant, but the bulk of the impact of monetary policy on
commodity prices transits through the indirect channel of expected growth and in￿ ation, as also
reported by Barsky and Kilian (2004).
This being established, the next reasonable step is to assess the dynamic response of the
variables to the monetary policy shock. We accomplish this in a VAR system, featuring the mon-
etary policy shock and, in turn, oil supply, oil stocks and non-commercial net long positions. The
preferred speci￿cation, according to the Akaike information criterion, is a VAR(1) for the case of
production, a VAR(2) in the case of stocks and a VAR(3) for speculative positions.
The identi￿cation scheme adopted in these simple bivariate VARs is Choelski, with the mon-
etary policy shock order ￿rst.19 Given the lack of signi￿cance of the lags of the monetary policy
shock, as outlined above, impulse responses to a monetary policy shock (Figure 6) are not hump-
shaped, but rather smoothly-decreasing.
17We also tried di⁄erent speci￿cations including more lags of the dependent variable and/or the monetary policy
shock, but we failed to identify any relevant pattern of signi￿cance. Therefore, to keep the model to a reasonable
size, we decided to stick to a very parsimonious formulation, which is also preferred by any information criterion.
18The net speculative positions represent an exception with this respect, but we remark that most of the explanatory
power of the regression come from the serial dependence of speculative positions on their past.
19This choice is motivated by the fact that in the regressions performed above we found a contemporaneous impact
of the monetary policy shock on oil supply and inventories but not vice-versa.21
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Notes: The x-axes report the months after the shock. Solid and dashed lines are, respectively, 68% and 90%
con￿dence bands.
Having assessed that monetary policy plays a role in explaining ￿at least partly ￿oil price
developments, and that the ￿ ￿nancial channel￿appears to have some signi￿cance, an interesting
question is whether the recent oil price surge and collapse can be ascribed to ￿nancial speculation.
The issue, however, is very di¢ cult to be examined for several reasons. First of all, the word
￿ speculation￿has itself a plethora of nuances and a practical de￿nition has to be agreed upon to
make formal assessment. Furthermore, data limitations further hamper a thorough assessment.
Using, as a proxy for speculative activity, the net long positioning of non-commercial agents on
the NYMEX disseminated by the CFTC, we test weather positions have some ability in predicting
oil prices. Our results are based on a VAR system at weekly frequency from January 2, 1996 to
November 2, 2009 (716 observations) featuring returns on WTI crude oil prices and non-commercial
net long positions on WTI futures contracts.20 A Granger causality test (Table 2) highlights that
the null hypothesis of absence of causality can be reject only for what concerns the direction from
prices to speculative positions.21 So, if any causality exists, it goes into the opposite direction:
speculative positions do not cause price increases, but rather price increases can suggest speculators
to enter the market and hence cause an increase in speculative positions.
Table 2: Granger causality test for speculative positions and returns on WTI oil prices
H0 F-stat P-value
NETLONG does not Granger Cause R_WTI 0.68790 0.5030
R_WTI does not Granger Cause NETLONG 4.87384 0.0079
20This is due to the fact that CFTC discloses data on speculative positions at weekly frequency. Lag length in the
VAR was chosen according to minimization of the Akaike Informaion Criterion.
21For the sake of robustness, we also repeated the test by including in the VAR crude oil stocks, and in that no
causality relationship was found.
ed22
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Our results are in line with those already present in the literature, Gorton et al. (2008).
Nevertheless, we also stress that this is the mostly wide indicator used in the literature (Haigh,
Hranaiova and Overdahl, 2005, IMF, 2006). Using non-public CFTC data, B￿y￿k‚ sahin et al.
(2008) conducted a wider set of test and found that the activity of non-commercial agents helped
linking futures and spot prices; Haigh, Hranaiova and Overdahl (2007) fail to identify an impact
of hedge funds on oil price volatility.
3.1 Robustness check
To check the robustness of our results on the transmission channel, we repeated the regression of
Table 1 by employing di⁄erent identi￿cation schemes for the monetary policy shock as explanatory
variables. As in section 2.4, we have used a very simple Choleski scheme (Boivin and Giannoni,
2006), a ￿nancial-markets-based measure (Kuttner, 2001) and a more narrative approach (Romer
and Romer, 2004).
Table 3: Regression results of oil supply, oil stocks on alternative monetary policy shocks
Boivin & Giannoni Kuttner Romer & Romer
Dep. Variable: Supply
MP Shock 0.4908* -0.0017 -0.0088
MP Shock (-1) ￿ 0.0109* ￿
Supply (-1) 0.0363* -0.0995 0.0692
Supply (-2) -0.1457* -0.1444* -0.1604*
Supply (-3) -0.1223* ￿ ￿
Dep. Variable: Stocks
MP Shock -0.5653* -0.0256 -0.0019
Stocks (-1) ￿ ￿ 0.0273
Dep. Variable: Net long
MP Shock -1242654￿ 25050.5 ￿
Net long (-1) 0.895** 0.864** ￿
Net long (-2) -0.276* -0.157￿ ￿
Net long (-3) 0.163* ￿ ￿
￿, * and ** indicate, respectively, signi￿cance of the coe¢ cientat the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Results of the regressions are reported in Table 3; as before, the lag choice is motivated by
the Schwarz information criterion. The shock ￿ la Boivin and Giannoni (2006), being the one more
closely related, in its construction, to Kim (1999), gives results that are very similar to those of
Table 1, and thus con￿rms our analysis. For the other two shocks, the picture is a bit more blurred.
Kuttner (2001) gives favourable results for the impact of the monetary policy shock on supply, but
the impact on stocks, albeit of the correct sign, appears to be non-signi￿cant. The shock extracted23
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using the Romer and Romer (2004) approach has instead always non-signi￿cant impacts, although
the sign for stocks is correct.22
4 Concluding remarks
This paper constitutes a formal econometric assessment of the theoretical result, ￿rst presented
by Frankel (1984), that monetary policy has an impact on commodity prices. Our main ￿nding
is supportive of this theoretical argument and in line with the results of Barsky and Kilian (2002)
but we also found that the e⁄ect of an expansionary monetary policy in the US does not appear
to be overwhelmingly large.
Our ￿ndings also suggest that the extraordinarily monetary policy easing deployed to contrast
the real e⁄ects of the ￿nancial crisis is likely to push commodity prices up, albeit to a small
extent. However, we acknowledge that our identi￿cation scheme is not designed to account for
unconventional monetary policy measures, so that larger e⁄ects cannot be ruled out. While this is
of course an interesting research avenue, it would require a brand new identi￿cation strategy for
the monetary policy shock which is beyond the scope of this paper.
22Due to limited data availability, we could not check the impact of the Romer and Romer (2004) shock on net
long positions in futures markets.24
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Notes: the x-axes reports the months after the shock; 68% con￿dence bands. shaded areas reproduce
the bands under the baseline identi￿cation; red lines = Boivin and Giannoni (1986); black lines = sign
restrictions.25
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